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Abstract
Has de￿ ation contributed to the long lasting stagnation of the Japanese
economy? Could the Bank of Japan have stopped de￿ ation by implementing
a more expansionary monetary policy? Our tentative answers are probably
not to the ￿rst question, and probably yes to the second question. We ￿nd
that the total cost of de￿ ation over the period 1995-2003 has been close to
a 1.1% rate of lost GDP. Yet, on the basis of statistical signi￿cance and
robustness to speci￿cation choices, this evidence is not compelling. On the
other hand, the estimated positive linkage between nominal base money
growth and in￿ ation is signi￿cant and robust, even given current economic
conditions. However, in order to be in￿ ationary, monetary policy should
have been more expansionary than what actually observed, even since the
launch of the quantitative easing in 2001.
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21. Introduction
To date the Japanese economy has been a⁄ected by price de￿ ation for almost a
decade. In fact, the annual in￿ ation rate measured by the GDP de￿ ator has been
negative since 1995, apart from 1997, averaging at an annual rate of about -1.2%
over the period 1995-2003. Current in￿ ation developments suggest that de￿ ation-
ary dynamics are still active, with quarterly in￿ ation for 2004Q1 at -0.45%. Over
the same time period output growth has been low (the average annual rate of real
GDP growth has been 1.4%; it was 3.5% in the 1980s) and highly volatile (the
standard deviation of the annual rate of GDP growth has increased from 1.6% for
the 1980s to 2.2% for the period 1995-2004). Price de￿ ation is not unrelated to
the weak growth dynamics of the Japanese economy over the last decade. In the
literature, several explanations for the Japanese stagnation have been proposed,
pointing to both demand and supply side factors.1 A typical description of the
demand side explanation would suggest that de￿ ation has followed the contrac-
tion in aggregate demand determined by the reduction in investment spending
associated with the fall in potential output (Krugman, 1998) and ￿nancial in-
termediation problems following the burst of the stock market bubble (Bayoumi,
1999; Ogakawa and Suzuki, 1998). The presence of a liquidity trap and Ricardian
e⁄ects, would have also made monetary and ￿scal policies ine⁄ective, explaining
the persistence of de￿ ation over time, despite the expansionary monetary and
￿scal policies carried out over the time period considered.2 A di⁄erent interpreta-
tion of the Japanese de￿ ation, still grounded on a demand side explanation, has
been proposed by Hetzel (1999, 2003) and Meltzer (2001). According to Hetzel
(1999, 2003), the persistent de￿ ation in Japan since 1995 would have been due
to overly restrictive monetary policy, consequential to the reaction of the Bank
of Japan to the growing price bubble in stock and land markets started in May
1989.3 On the other hand, from a supply side perspective, Hayashi and Prescott
1The main explanations for the Japanese slowdown suggested in the literature point to in-
adequate ￿scal and monetary policies to bring the economy out of the liquidity trap, depressed
investment due to over-investment during the bubble period of the late 1980s and early 1990s
and problems with ￿nancial intermediation following the bursting of the bubble, and the re-
duction in potential output growth determined by a productivity slowdown and demographic
e⁄ects. See for instance Morana (2004) for additional details.
2Yet, there is not agreement in the literature concerning whether a liquidity trap has a⁄ected
or is a⁄ecting the Japanese economy. See for instance Fujiki et al. (2002), Kimura et al. (2002),
Orphanides (2004), Bordo and Filardo (2004) for a skeptical view.
3Over the period 1989:2-1990:4 the Gensaki rate increased of 330 basis points, from 4.3%
to 7.6%. As a consequence, base money growth started to decline in 1990, becoming negative
3(2002), have pointed to a fall in total factor productivity and in the supply of
labour as the cause of the Japanese stagnation over the 1990s, while Andolfatto
(2003) has shown that a sequence of negative productivity shocks may have de￿ a-
tionary e⁄ects, since the increase in the demand for money, following the portfolio
shift to real balances due to the fall in the real and nominal interest rates, would
lead to an increase in the value of money and therefore to a reduction in the price
level.4
Interestingly, evidence from Mio (2002) suggests that both demand and supply
factors may be relevant to explain in￿ ation dynamics over the 1990s, with declines
in both aggregate demand and supply explaining output and price dynamics since
1995. Similar results have also been obtained by Yamada et al. (2003) for the
period 2000-2002, with a slight dominance of demand factors over supply factors,
while for Cargill and Parker (2004), Baba et al. (2004) and Ito and Mishkin (2004)
demand factors are the key explanation of de￿ ation in Japan.
Independently of the origin of de￿ ation, i.e. demand side (monetary-real) or
supply side, a key issue concerns the feedback e⁄ects that price dynamics may ex-
ercise on output. From a theoretical point of view, de￿ ation can a⁄ect negatively
economic activity by depressing aggregate demand through di⁄erent channels. A
￿rst important channel, concerning investment spending, has initially been sug-
gested by Fisher (1933): falling prices, by increasing the real burden of debt, may
lead to bankruptcy both leveraged operating companies and ￿nancial institutions,
impairing the ability of borrowing and lending. Moreover, de￿ ation may also af-
fect negatively investment spending by increasing the real interest rate. When
nominal interest rates have already reached the zero lower bound, the impact on
investment spending may be particularly strong, since the central bank cannot
reduce the real interest rate by reducing the nominal interest rate. A second
important channel concerns consumption spending: in the expectation of lower
future prices, and as a consequence of a higher real interest rate, consumption
in 1991 (-1.4%) and close to zero in 1992 (0.3%). Money growth (M2+CD) started to decline
in 1991 (2%), becoming negative in 1992 (-0.5%). Since 1993, despite the steady increase in
monetary base growth from 4% to 16% (apart from the fall in 2000), money growth has averaged
around a value of about 3%. Over the same time period, as measured by the GDP de￿ ator,
in￿ ation started to decrease in 1992, with disin￿ ation turning into de￿ ation in 1995.
4Recently, Morana (2004) has provided empirical evidence in favour of the Hayashi-Prescott
hypothesis, while Kamawoto (2004) has found that the reduction in productivity growth may
be an artifact due to unaccounted features, such as imperfect competition, varying utilisation of
capital and labour and cyclical reallocation of inputs across sectors, in the computation of the
Solow￿ s residual.
4expenditure may be shifted into the future, negatively a⁄ecting current consump-
tion. However, there are also theoretical arguments pointing to the optimality of
de￿ ation for the allocation of resources in the economy. In fact, as suggested by
Friedman (1969), zero nominal interest rates are necessary for e¢ cient resource
allocation, implying an optimal rate of de￿ ation equal to (minus) the real inter-
est rate.5 More recently, Cole and Kocherlakota (1998), in the framework of the
neoclassical monetary growth model, have also shown that zero nominal interest
rates are not only a necessary condition for e¢ cient allocation of resources, but
also a su¢ cient condition.6
In the paper we address two main questions. The ￿rst question concerns the
real e⁄ects that de￿ ation may have had on the Japanese economy. Answering
this question is important to assess what are the actual e⁄ects of a moderate, yet
persistent, de￿ ation for an industrialised country like Japan. It is also important
from a theoretical point of view, since from the perspective of Friedman￿ s rule
moderate de￿ ation is not a negative phenomenon. Given the attainment of the
zero nominal interest rate bound over the last decade, the Japanese experience is
a unique opportunity to get further insights on this issue from an empirical point
of view. To the author knowledge, no quantitative assessment of the costs of the
Japanese de￿ ation has been carried out in the literature so far, and the available
evidence is mixed. For instance, Ito (2003) suggests that de￿ ation may have had
some depressing e⁄ects on the Japanese economy, since the ex-ante and ex-post
real interest rates have tended to be higher than the equilibrium real interest rate.
Yet, Baba et al. (2004) do not ￿nd evidence of a signi￿cant increase in the real
interest rate since the mid 1990s. Moreover, the linkage between corporate bank-
ruptcies and de￿ ation is not convincing, as the cause of corporate bankruptcies
should be probably found in weak economic activity, also causing de￿ ation, given
the lack of evidence of a de￿ ationary spiral (Baba et al., 2004). Yet, according to
Ito and Mishkin (2004) a de￿ ationary spiral would have set in since 2002, with
important consequences for investment, consumption and corporate bankruptcies
5The argument follows from the equalisation of the marginal cost of printing money and the
opportunity cost of holding money. See also Uhlig (2004).
6Yet, in the presence of nominal rigidities, theoretical results point to an optimal in￿ ation rate
equal to zero, or as large as the real interest rate when the costs from holding money balances
are taken into account. However, as shown by recent Asian experience, it is possible that even
downward nominal wage in￿ exibility may disappear as agents get used to de￿ ation, so that
real wages and the unemployment rate may not increase during de￿ ationary episodes. Hence,
nominal rigidities may be more important in an in￿ ationary environment than in a de￿ ationary
one (Bordo and Filardo, 2004).
5(Ito, 2004). Finally, according to results in Kuroda et al. (2003), wage rigidi-
ties may have not contributed to the increase in unemployment. Interestingly, as
pointed out by Atkenson and Kehoe (2004) and Bordo and Filardo (2004), the
historical evidence of a positive linkage between de￿ ation and depression is com-
pelling only for the 1930s. Neglecting the 1930s, the two phenomena appear to be
unrelated 90% of the times, since in general de￿ ation has coincided with robust
economic growth.7
The second question concerns the ability of monetary policy to in￿ ate the
economy. Independently of the factors which would have lead the Japanese econ-
omy in stagnation and de￿ ation, the persistence of de￿ ation over the last decade
can be seen as a consequence of inappropriate monetary policy. In practice the
Bank of Japan would have had the power to end de￿ ation by allowing broad
monetary aggregates to increase more rapidly by means of an aggressive policy of
reserves creation, rather than allowing reserves to increase in line with demand
(Hetzel, 2003; 2004).8 Such a policy should have been implemented by following
a non orthodox strategy aimed at purchasing illiquid assets (long term bonds,
equities), leading to a fall in the real interest rate through the e⁄ects of portfo-
lio rebalancing (Goodfriend, 2000) and the formation of expectations for future
higher in￿ ation determined by a sustained money growth persisting into the future
(Krugman, 1998). In the paper we aim to assess empirically whether a linkage
between monetary base growth and in￿ ation can be found over the last decade, in
order to assess the actual power currently in the hand of the monetary authority
to in￿ uence price dynamics.
Our contribution to the literature is also original from the point of view of
the econometric methodology employed. In fact, we use a Generalised Flexible
Least Square approach to VAR estimation, which allows to model endogenously
structural change and parameter instability, which, in the light of previous results
available in the literature, may be expected for the data at hand. In fact, both
Miyao (2000) and Ahearne et al. (2002) have pointed to a structural break in
monetary policy e⁄ectiveness in the 1990s, relatively to the 1970s and 1980s, with
monetary policy being less e⁄ective in the last decade. By means of the proposed
methodology we can compare the working of the Japanese macroeconomy over two
di⁄erent periods. The ￿rst period, i.e. the 1980s, is a period of normal economic
7The contrasting evidence provided by Engelbrecht and Langley (2001) can be explained by
the shorter sample employed by these latter authors (1960-1994).
8See also Bordo and Filardo (2004) for arguments in favour of targeting monetary aggregates
during de￿ ation.
6activity, with sustained growth and substantial price stability. The second period,
i.e. 1995-2004, is a period of high volatility in real GDP growth, low growth and
de￿ ation. Allowing for an endogenous updating of the parameters of the model,
the proposed approach should allow to draw reliable conclusions concerning the
working of the Japanese economy and the e⁄ectiveness of monetary policy in the
most recent period. The results of the paper suggest that there are some merits
in the econometric modelling implemented.
We do not ￿nd compelling evidence that de￿ ation has exercised a negative
impact on real activity in Japan. On the other hand, we are able to draw robust
conclusions concerning the signi￿cant in￿ ationary impact that a policy of mon-
etary base creation may have on the Japanese economy, albeit policy should be
more expansionary than what actually observed, even since the introduction of
the quantitative easing in 2001.
After this introduction, the paper is organised as follows. In section two we
introduce the econometric methodology. In section three we present the empirical
results. Finally in section four we conclude.
2. Econometric methodology
In the paper we have employed a time-varying parameter vector autoregressive
model (VAR) model estimated by Generalised Flexible Least Squares (GFLS)
(Kalaba and Tesfatsion, 1990; Roncalli, 1996). The GFLS ￿lter is closely re-
lated to the Kalman ￿lter, with the advantage of not requiring any distributional
assumptions concerning the innovations to the measurement and transition equa-
tions. Let us consider the vector of n I(1) non cointegrated variables of interest
xt: The time-varying parameter stationary VAR representation of the series can
then be written as
￿t(L)yt = mt + "t t = 1;:::;T (2.1)
where yt = ￿xt, mt is a n￿1 vector of time-varying intercept terms, "t~IID(0;￿),
￿t (L) = In ￿
Pp
i=1 ￿i;t￿iLi. By rewriting the model in state space form and
neglecting disturbances (discrepancies for the measurement and transition equa-
tions), we have the measurement equation
yt = Ht￿t + mt
and the transition equation
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and Y￿1;t is the n ￿ p vector of lagged
observations on the yt processes, ￿t is the pn2 ￿ 1 vector of parameters, dt is a
pn2 ￿1 vector of drift terms (assumed to be a null vector in our application), and
Ft = Ipn2:
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0 Dt [￿t+1 ￿ Ft￿t ￿ dt];
where Mt and Dt are symmetric and positive de￿nite scaling matrices of appropri-
ate dimensions, assumed to be identity in our application, the GFLS estimation
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where ￿ is a known penalisation term for parameters￿dynamics.
























8where at is the GFLS estimate of the state vector. After ￿ltering, smoothing can
be implemented through the formula
atjT= st + Gtat+1jT
with aTjT = aT:
A key issue in GFLS estimation is the selection of the value of the penalisation
parameter ￿. Our solution to this problem is carrying out estimation over a
wide grid of values (0 - 100000)9, and selecting ￿ in such a way that the total cost
c2
M (￿)+c2
D (￿) is minimised. The Monte Carlo analysis reported in the Appendix
supports the proposed approach.
To carry out impulse response analysis, the residual vector "t can be estimated






The orthogonalised innovations can then be obtained by the Choleski decompo-
sition of the ^ ￿ matrix as vt = B^ "t, where B is the Choleski factor of ^ ￿, such
that ^ ￿ = BB
0
. As far as the computations of the impulse response functions,
the Vector Moving Average (VMA) representation can be obtained by standard
inversion of the VAR model, conditional to a given set of parameter values. In
theory, given T usable observations it would be possible to recover T di⁄erent
paths for the impulse response functions, each associated with the given value of
the state vector at the corresponding time period t; t = 1;:::;T. In the paper
we have computed impulse response functions based on the average value of the
state vector over two di⁄erent time periods, i.e. a ￿rst period corresponding to
normal economic activity (1980:1-1989:4) and a second period corresponding to
the de￿ ation period (1995:1-2004:1).
3. Empirical results
In the paper we have used quarterly data for real GDP growth, the GDP de￿ a-
tor in￿ ation rate, nominal monetary base growth, and the overnight call rate.10
Data are for the period 1980:1-2004:1 and are taken from the OECD Main Eco-
nomic Indicators (SourceOECD). Preliminary data analysis suggest that real GDP
9Note that GFLS is equivalent to OLS as ￿ ! 1:
10The overnight rate is the uncollaterised overnight call rate for the period 1985:3-2004:1. For
the period 1980:1-1985:2 we have used the collaterised overnight call rate.
9growth is an I(0) process, while the other three processes should be modelled as
I(1) processes.11 Since the four processes are not cointegrated, we specify the
VAR model in terms of the real output growth rate and the ￿rst di⁄erences of
the in￿ ation rate, the overnight rate and the nominal monetary base growth rate.
The VAR has been identi￿ed by the Choleski decomposition approach, with the
ordering determined by the speed with which the variables are supposed to react
to shocks, namely in￿ ation, GDP, interest rate and monetary base, with the mon-
etary base showing the quickest response and in￿ ation the lowest.12 While three
lags could be selected for the constant parameter model according to speci￿cation
tests and the AIC criterion, for the time varying parameter model only two lags
have been found necessary to yield serially uncorrelated disturbances. Hence, we
have adopted this latter more parsimonious speci￿cation in the rest of the analy-
sis. As already mentioned, a key issue in GFLS estimation is the selection of the
penalisation parameter for the dynamic cost. In Figure 1 we have plotted the
cost e¢ cient frontier, representing the trade-o⁄ between the measurement and
dynamic cost, and the total cost against the value of the penalisation parameter
for a sub set of the grid of parameter values analysed (1 < ￿ < 250). In the
￿gure we have also plotted the total cost for the entire parameter space analysed
(1 < ￿ < 100000). As is shown in the plots, the selection of the optimal value for
the penalisation parameter, according to the total cost minimisation rule, is clear-
cut. In fact the results point to a global minimum corresponding to a value of the
penalisation parameter equal to 16. Hence, this latter value has been employed
in the rest of the analysis.
3.1. Does de￿ ation have real e⁄ect ?
De￿ ation can a⁄ect negatively the economy through di⁄erent channels. As ini-
tially pointed out by Fisher (1933), declining prices increase the burden of debt
and the risk of default, potentially leading to bankruptcy both leveraged operat-
ing companies and ￿nancial institutions or, by lowering the value of asset prices
and collaterals, and weakening balance sheets and net corporate asset values,
to impaired ability of borrowing and lending. The latter may a⁄ect negatively
11See also Banerjee and Ruseell (2001). Yet recent evidence would point to long memory as
the cause of persistence of the in￿ ation rate in Japan. In this respect, modelling it as an I(1)
process may be considered a useful approximation, preferable to the use of an I(0) model. This
is also in the light of the econometric tools employed, which allow only for I(1) or I(0) processes.
We however assess the robustness of the results to the selection of the integration order.
12The robustness of the ￿ndings has been carefully evaluated. See section 3.3.
10investment spending. Secondly, expected de￿ ation may also a⁄ect negatively in-
vestment spending by increasing the real interest rate. This second channel may
become particularly important when the nominal interest rate cannot be further
reduced, having reached, as for the case of Japan, the zero lower bound. Thirdly,
expected de￿ ation may shift consumption into the future, in the expectation of
lower future prices and by increasing the real interest rate. Moreover, by leading
to the transfer of purchasing power from borrowers to lenders, that is from agents
with high propensity to consume to agents with low propensity to consume, can
negatively a⁄ect both current and future consumption. Hence, the negative ef-
fects of de￿ ation on the economy would be exercised by lowering current aggregate
demand.
In order to assess whether de￿ ation has had a negative impact on production
in Japan over the last decade, we have compared impulse response functions of
output to an in￿ ation shock, computed using the average value of the coe¢ cients
estimated over the period 1980:1-1989:4 and over the period 1995:1-2004:1. The
￿rst period corresponds to a period of normal economic activity for Japan, with
rapid growth and low in￿ ation (the quarterly GDP growth and in￿ ation rates have
averaged at 0.94% and 0.6%, respectively). The latter period is characterised by
higher volatility in output growth, stagnation (apart from the most recent period)
and de￿ ation (the quarterly GDP growth and in￿ ation rates have averaged at
0.39% and -0.31%, respectively). In terms of forecast error variance decomposition
the in￿ ation shock explains between 96% and 100% of in￿ ation variability in the
period 1980:1-1989:4 and between 86% and 100% in the period 1995:1-2004:1. The
results of the impulse response analysis are reported in Figure 2. As is shown in
the plot, the evidence points to an asymmetry concerning the medium-long term
e⁄ect of de￿ ationary shocks in the two periods. In fact, while in both periods a
de￿ ationary shock would have exercised a positive contemporaneous impact on
output, over the 1980s the medium-long term impact is null, while over the 1995-
2004 period the impact is negative. Yet, the impact of the de￿ ation shock is
not statistically signi￿cant in both periods, also explaining a low proportion of
output variability (0%-2%). In terms of the magnitude of the e⁄ect, it can be
noted that a fall of 1% in annual in￿ ation relatively to the base line would lead to
a permanent fall in annual GDP of about 0.1%.13 Between 1995-2003 GDP has
grown of about 12.9%, while the GDP de￿ ator has fallen of about 11%. Then,
13It is important to note that this asymmetry could have not been detected by standard
constant parameter VAR analysis, which, on the other hand, points to a signi￿cant positive
impact of a de￿ ationary shock also in the medium-long term.
11everything else equal, maintaining price stability would have contributed with
a 1.1% rate of additional GDP growth over the last decade.14 Yet, this results
should be evaluated with some caution, given the low precision of the estimates,
and, as it will be shown below, the lack of robustness to speci￿cation choices.
3.2. Can monetary policy stop de￿ ation?
In the literature the persistent de￿ ation in Japan over the last decade has in gen-
eral been interpreted as a consequence of inappropriate monetary policy. Accord-
ing to Buiter (2003), ￿sustained unwanted de￿ ation is evidence of policy failure.
Both the knowledge and tools exist to prevent unwanted de￿ ation￿ . In fact, de-
spite nominal short term rates close to the zero lower bound and a banking system
severely a⁄ected by the collapse of asset prices, monetary policy has been mostly
carried out in a conventional manner, i.e. by operating on the nominal overnight
rate, with outright purchases of long term bonds only of the size necessary to
match money demand developments.15 In practice the Bank of Japan would have
had the power to end de￿ ation by allowing broad monetary aggregates to increase
more rapidly by means of an aggressive policy of reserves creation (Hetzel, 2003).
Such a policy should have been implemented by following a non orthodox strategy
aimed at purchasing illiquid assets (long term bonds, equities), forcing portfolio
rebalancing by the public, in the assumption of imperfect substitutability of as-
14Additional GDP growth would have been close to 3% had price in￿ ation been stabilised at
an annual rate of 2%.
15Short term rates were reduced gradually between 1990 and 1995 to levels close to zero, and
maintained at fractional levels thereafter. The zero interest rate policy was started in 1999,
reversed in August 2000 and reversed again in March 2001, coupled with a quantitative easing
aimed at increasing banks reserves. However, the latter has lead to an expansion in reserves of
an amount determined by banks￿demand at the zero interest rate, rather than to an increase
beyond such a level (Hetzel, 2003). Since October 2003 the quantitative easing policy has been
formalised in a commitment to maintain the zero interest rate policy until de￿ ationary pressures
have been dispelled (i.e. until the year on year CPI excluding fresh food rate has achieved a
level of 0% or a higher sustainable rate). Recently, the assessment of quantitative easing policy
has pointed to the e¢ cacy of the policy in keeping short term rates close to zero, supporting the
recovery of the economic activity (BoJ, 2004). However, as pointed by Okina and Shiratsuka
(2004), as a consequence of low economic growth, monetary policy would have failed to reverse
de￿ ationary expectations. Moreover, according to Baba et al. (2004), the reduced worth of
lenders and borrowers would also be at the root of the failure of the expansionary monetary
policy to a⁄ect investment, output and prices.
12sets (Goodfriend, 2000).16 The imperfect substitutability of assets implies that
a change in the supply of an asset has an impact on its price and return even
in the presence of a liquidity trap (Meltzer, 1999). Hence, through portfolios re-
balancing, long term interest rates would have fallen and asset prices increased.
The latter, through Tobin￿ s q e⁄ects and wealth e⁄ects would have a⁄ected in-
vestment and consumption. Moreover, as a consequence of the increase in asset
prices, borrowers￿balance sheets, the value of collateral and the net corporate
asset values of banks and ￿nancial institutions would have improved, increasing
borrowing and lending abilities and investment. Finally, open market operations
would have exercised their e⁄ects on interest rates by working through the expec-
tation of future higher in￿ ation, and hence lower real interest rates determined by
sustained money growth persisting into the future (Krugman, 1998). Also through
this latter channel it should have been feasible for the monetary authority to af-
fect longer maturities.17 Hence, through the above mentioned channels monetary
policy could have a⁄ected positively output growth and in￿ ation.
In order to assess whether the central bank could have stopped de￿ ation by
allowing for a sustained growth in monetary aggregates, in Figure 3 we have plot-
ted the impulse response functions of in￿ ation to a positive monetary base growth
shock for the two sub periods analysed. In terms of forecast error variance decom-
position, this shock accounts for a proportion of variability in base money growth
between 96% and 98% in the period 1980:1-1989:4 and between 59% and 97% in
the period 1995:1-2004:1. Di⁄erently from what found by Kimura et al. (2002),
the results suggest that the central bank could have indeed in￿ ated the economy
by allowing for a more rapid growth in the monetary base. The result holds for
the de￿ ation sample and for the overall sample size when estimation is performed
by OLS, but, interestingly, not for the 1980s. Yet the e⁄ects of a monetary base
growth shock on in￿ ation in the 1995-2004 period are weak: a 3% increase in the
16Recently Hetzel (2004) has further re￿ned this proposal. According to Hetzel (2004), BoJ
should set a target in terms of the price level, and use base money growth as an instrument.
The objective would be to relate the demand for excess reserves to the price level, rather than
allowing the monetary base to depend on the demand for reserves. BoJ would set an objective
for the level of excess reserves, to which banks should adjust, on the basis of the deviation of
the price level from the target. Portfolio rebalancing by the public would then be obtained by
￿rst exchanging all short term assets in the portfolio of the central bank for long term illiquid
assets, and then carry out open market purchases of long term bonds and ETFs replicating the
Topix.
17Other non orthodox policies have been suggested by McCallum (2000), Svensson (2001),
Meltzer (1999b), Buiter and Panigirtzoglu (2001), Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003). See also
Fujiki et al. (2001) and Svensson (2003).
13annual monetary base growth rate over the base line would have only lead to a
0.1% increase in the annual in￿ ation rate, suggesting the need of much higher rates
of nominal base growth than the ones actually observed over the last decade, also
since the start of the quantitative easing policy in 2001, to contrast de￿ ationary
pressures.18,19 The forecast error variance decomposition supports this result, sug-
gesting that in￿ ation variability has been little explained by surprises in monetary
base growth over the 1980s (0%-2%), while the proportion of in￿ ation variance
explained by the monetary base growth shock has increased in the most recent
period (3%-9%).
In Figure 4 we plot the impulse response functions of in￿ ation to an output
shock. This shock has a permanent impact on output, being interpretable in
terms of a productivity shock in the ￿rst part of the sample, given the negative
correlation of output and in￿ ation, and in terms of a demand shock (unrelated
to monetary shock) for the second part of the sample. The shock accounts for a
proportion of output variability in the range 81%-99% in the period 1980:1-1989:4
and 91%-99% in the period 1995:1-2002:4. The results suggest that a positive real
demand shock may help to in￿ ate the economy: a 1.7% annual increase in output
over the base line may lead to a permanent increase in the annual in￿ ation rate of
0.14%. In terms of forecast error variance decomposition the output shock would
seem to have contributed little to in￿ ation variability over the 1980s (0%-1%),
while the proportion of in￿ ation variance explained by the shock has increased
noticeably in the most recent period (0%-8%).
The overall picture emerging from the analysis is that monetary policy may be
e⁄ective in in￿ ating the economy, but that a policy mix would also be successful.
For instance, such a policy mix could be implemented by coupling Hetzel (2004)
proposal with the underwriting of the central bank of government bonds in com-
pensation for a tax cut (Goodfriend, 2000). Both the expansionary monetary and
￿scal stimula would in fact tend to exercise positive e⁄ects on in￿ ation.
18Nominal monetary base growth has been about 15% in 2001, 19% in 2002 and 16% in 2003.
Over the period 1995-2003 base money growth has been close to 90%.
19It is unlikely that the required policy interventions may be regarded as modest, according
to the metric of Leeper and Zha (2003). Hence, the actual policy e⁄ects may deviate from the
predicted e⁄ects due to revisions in agents￿expectations, as also pointed out by Lucas (1976).
Yet, our results are still valid and may be considered as referring to a worst case scenario, since
the updating in agents￿expectations should lead to a more e⁄ective in￿ ationary policy. In fact
the revision in expectations is in the direction of a positive or less negative in￿ ation rate.
143.3. Robustness analysis
In order to assess the robustness of the results, three di⁄erent exercises have
been carried out. The ￿rst exercise aims to assess the sensitivity of the policy
implications of our paper to the value of the penalising parameter employed for
estimation. On the other hand, the second exercise is close in spirit to thick
modelling estimation proposed in Granger and Jeon (2004), and aims to assess
the sensitivity of the policy conclusions to model speci￿cation and ordering of the
variables in the VAR, also controlling for the value of the penalisation parameter
in a sub case. Finally, motivated by recent results which suggest that the Japanese
in￿ ation rate is a weakly stationary process (I(0) in Grier and Perry, 1998; I(d)
d > 0 in Conrad and Karanasos (2004), Baum et al. (1999) and Baillie et al.
(1996)), the third exercise aims to assess the sensitivity of the policy conclusions
to the order of fractional di⁄erencing of the variables in the VAR, also controlling
for the value of the penalisation parameter and ordering of the variables. This
analysis is clearly of interest since. under the assumption of stationarity, monetary
base growth shocks may exercise a persistent impact on the in￿ ation rate, but a
permanent one only on the price level.
The results of the ￿rst robustness exercise are reported in Figure 5, where im-
pulse responses of output (to de￿ ation shock) and in￿ ation (to real demand shock
and nominal monetary base shock) have been plotted. Impulse response func-
tions have been computed assuming four values for the penalisation parameters,
in addition to the optimally selected one (￿ = 16), i.e. ￿ = (1;16;50;100;1000):
As is shown in the Figure, the in￿ ationary e⁄ects of the monetary base growth
shock and the demand (non monetary) shock are qualitatively robust to the se-
lection of the penalisation parameter. On the other hand, the negative e⁄ects of
the de￿ ation shock on output are less robust, with the e⁄ects turning positive as
the value of the penalisation parameter increases above 50. The results of the
second robustness exercise are reported in Figure 6, where median impulse re-
sponse functions of output and in￿ ation have been reported. Impulse response
functions have been computed from a VAR(1) model and a VAR(3) model, in
addition to the selected VAR(2) model, considering two di⁄erent orderings of the
variables, i.e. the selected ordering (￿;y;i;m) and its inverse (m;i;y;￿): As for
the penalisation parameter, we have considered two sub cases. In the ￿rst sub
case the value has been allowed to vary, i.e. ￿ = (0:2;1;10;100;1000); while in
the second case it has been kept ￿xed at the optimally selected value (￿ = 16): Fi-
nally, for any setting of the parameters 1000 Monte Carlo simulations have been
computed. Hence, the median impulse response functions reported in Figure 6
15have been obtained from empirical distributions with cross sectional dimension
equal to 30000 observations in the ￿rst sub case (￿ varying), and 6000 observa-
tions in the second sub case (￿ ￿xed). As is shown in Figure 6, the results of the
robustness exercise are similar for the two cases analysed, pointing to a zero or
positive impact of a de￿ ation shock on output, a negative impact of the output
shock on in￿ ation and a positive impact of the nominal monetary base growth
shock on in￿ ation. The results of the third robustness exercise are reported in
Figure 7, where median impulse response functions of output and in￿ ation have
been reported, in addition to the ones estimated following the optimality criterion.
Impulse response functions have been computed from a VARFIMA(1, d) model20,
considering as before two di⁄erent orderings: As for the penalisation parameter
and the fractional di⁄erencing parameter, we have considered three and four val-
ues, respectively, in addition to the optimally selected ones (￿ = 10; d = 0:38), i.e.
￿ = (1;10;100;1000); d = (0;0:1;0:2;0:3;0:4): Finally, for any setting of the pa-
rameters 1000 Monte Carlo simulations have been computed. Hence, the median
impulse response functions reported in Figure 7 have been obtained from empiri-
cal distributions with cross sectional dimension equal to 40000 observations.21 As
is shown in Figure 7, the results obtained from optimal estimation are coherent
with the ones reported in the previous Section only as far as the positive e⁄ects
of a monetary base growth shock are concerned. In fact, for the period 1995:1-
2004:1 we ￿nd that the de￿ ation shock has a positive impact on GDP, while the
output shock may be interpreted in terms of a productivity shock, rather than a
20The VARFIMA model has been estimated in two steps. In the ￿rst step the fractional
di⁄erencing parameter has been estimated for the variables included in the speci￿cation, i.e.
the in￿ ation rate, the output growth rate, the change in the overnight rate, the monetary base
growth rate, by means of semiparametric estimators (Sun and Phillips, 2003; Beltratti and
Morana, 2004). In the second step a VAR(1) model has been estimated using the ￿ltered series
by means of GFLS, and the VARFIMA(1,d) parameters have been computed exploiting its VAR
representation. Speci￿cation tests supports the selected model. The results of the semipara-
metric analysis point to the presence of stationary long memory for all the series included in
the speci￿cation, of a similar order, i.e. d = 0:38 (0:18): The estimated fractionally di⁄erencing
parameter for in￿ ation is much larger then the one obtained by Baillie et al. (1996) and Conrad
and Karanasos (2004), but similar to the one obtained by Baum et al. (1999), albeit these latter
authors also ￿nd evidence of non stationarity and almost I(1) behaviour in some cases. For
reasons of space we do not include detailed results, which are however available upon request
from the author.
21Note that the impulse responses plotted in Figure 7 are for the price level and the monetary
base, rather than for the in￿ ation rate and the monetary base growth rate.
16demand shock.22 On the other hand, the impact of a monetary base growth shock
is positive for both the in￿ ation rate and the price level, albeit permanent only
for this latter variable. As is also shown in the plot, thick estimation con￿rms
the results obtained from optimal estimation, pointing to a positive impact of the
de￿ ation shock on output, a negative impact of the output shock on in￿ ation and
the price level and a positive impact of the nominal monetary base growth shock
on in￿ ation and the price level. Hence, the overall assessment of the results of
the robustness analysis suggests some caution in concluding that de￿ ation has
had a negative impact on real economic activity. This latter ￿nding adds to the
concerns already arising from the lack of precision of the estimates. On the other
hand, the results strongly support the conclusion that an increase in the mone-
tary base may have an in￿ ationary impact on the Japanese economy, even given
current economic conditions, and therefore Hetzel (2004)￿ s proposal. Finally, the
results cast some doubts on the identi￿cation of the output shock in term of a
non monetary demand shock for the most recent period, not allowing therefore to
assess the robustness of the predicted e⁄ects of the implementation of a proposal
such as the one of Goodfriend (2000).
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to answer two questions: ￿rstly, has de￿ ation
contributed to the long lasting stagnation of the Japanese economy? Secondly,
could the Bank of Japan have stopped de￿ ation by allowing for a more expansion-
ary monetary policy? Our tentative answers are probably not to the ￿rst question
and probably yes to the second one. In fact, de￿ ation does not seem to have
exercised a signi￿cant negative impact on real economic activity. The result also
appears to be sensitive to speci￿cation choices. While there are good economic
reasons to expect a negative impact of a prolonged de￿ ation on economic activity,
it may be possible that the magnitude of the shock must be larger than what actu-
ally observed for Japan, in order to exercise such an e⁄ect. Since over the period
1995-2004 short term interest rates have been maintained at the zero lower bound,
our results may also have some implications concerning the macroeconomic desir-
ability of the involuntary implementation of Friedman￿ s rule. As ￿rstly pointed
out by Friedman (1969), from a theoretical point of view is tempting to think
that there may exist an optimal rate of de￿ ation, necessary to achieve an e¢ cient
22Similar results are reported in Baba et al. (2004), apart from the e⁄ects of the output shock
on in￿ ation.
17allocation of resources. In such a case negative consequences for real economic
activity should not be expected. Is this the case for Japan? A clear-cut answer
to this question requires further analysis, possibly considering also future devel-
opments in the Japanese economy. On the other hand, our results suggest that a
policy of monetary base creation could have contributed to signi￿cantly increase
the in￿ ation rate, even given current economic conditions. However, monetary
policy should have been more expansionary than what actually observed, even
since the launch of the quantitative easing policy in 2001.
5. Appendix: Monte Carlo results
In the Monte Carlo exercise we have evaluated the performance of the selection
criterion for the penalisation parameter based on the minimisation of the total
cost. The analysis has been carried out by comparing the Root Mean Square Error
(RMSE) associated with the sample path of the estimated parameters obtained by
using the total cost minimisation criterion, with the minimum attainable RMSE.
The latter corresponds to the minimum RMSE obtained by varying the value of
the penalisation parameter for the given realisation of the observations. Both
RMSEs have been computed relatively to the true sample path of the parameter.
In the analysis we have considered the model
yt = ￿txt + et t = 1;:::;100












E ["tvt] = 0; E ["tet] = 0; E [etvt] = 0
and assumed ￿ve di⁄erent values for the parameter ￿x = (0;0:3;0:6;0:9;1),
two values for the parameter ￿￿ = (0:5;1); six values for the parameter ￿" =
(0:125;0:25;0:5;0:75;1); one value for the parameter ￿v = (0:25); and six values
for the parameter ￿e = (0;0:125;0:25;0:5;0:75;1): The value of the parameter ￿
has been let to vary over a grid of 100 relevant values for the characteristics of the
simulated time series, i.e from 0.1 to 10. The number of Monte Carlo replications
for each case has been set equal to 200.
For reason of space in Tables 2-3 we have reported a selection of results, which
are however representative of the overall performance of the selection criterion
18suggested in the paper.23
The main ￿ndings of the Monte Carlo analysis are as follows. Firstly, the





e increase, i.e. when the proportion of variability of
the dependent variable due to the variability of the independent variable tends to
increase. For given values of the variance ratios, the performance of the rule and
of the estimator tends also to improve as the serial correlation in the dependent
variable increases. In particular, independently of the variance ratios, the perfor-
mance of the suggested rule and of the estimator tends to be very good in the case
of I(1) non stationarity in the variables, which is also the case of cointegration
between the dependent and independent variables, given the way the model has
been speci￿ed. This suggests that the GFLS estimator may be usefully employed
also for the estimation of time-varying cointegration relationships. All the above
discussed results hold independently of the value of the coe¢ cient determining
parameter￿ s dynamics (￿￿).
Overall the assessment of the performance of both the GFLS estimator and of
the proposed selection rule is positive. Not only the GFLS estimator works well
under di⁄erent degrees of noisiness of the processes, but the problem of selection of
the penalisation parameter may be e¢ ciently handled by total cost minimisation.
The average percentage increase in the RMSE due to the use of the total cost
minimisation criterion relatively to the minimum attainable RMSE over all the
simulations carried out is equal to +18% for the case ￿￿ = 1 and +17% for the
case ￿￿ = 0:5: On the other hand, the average absolute di⁄erence is only 0.05 for
the case ￿￿ = 1 and 0.04 for the case ￿￿ = 0:5:
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24Table 1, Panel A: Forecast error variance decomposition, 1980:1-1989:4





￿ y i m
98:28 0:82 6:72 2:31
1:20 88:09 5:60 0:17
0:19 0:09 87:44 0:06
0:33 11:00 0:24 97:46
￿ y i m
95:52 0:63 5:26 2:95
1:21 83:84 2:40 0:62
1:01 0:68 82:12 0:28
2:26 14:85 10:22 96:15
￿ y i m
96:70 0:27 5:17 3:15
1:26 82:10 1:28 0:78
0:86 0:93 83:96 0:29
1:18 16:70 9:59 95:78





￿ y i m
97:09 0:17 5:11 3:18
1:30 81:7 1:00 0:83
0:80 1:00 84:51 0:29
0:81 17:13 9:38 95:7
￿ y i m
97:45 0:09 5:05 3:22
1:33 81:37 0:78 0:87
0:75 1:06 84:95 0:29
0:47 17:48 9:22 95:62
Table 1, Panel B: Forecast error variance decomposition, 1995:1-2004:1





￿ y i m
90:46 2:05 3:72 1:23
0:23 94:66 10:19 28:28
0:17 0:09 86:06 0:12
9:14 3:20 0:03 70:37
￿ y i m
87:03 0:77 4:79 1:58
4:14 91:76 10:69 33:23
1:90 2:26 84:05 3:53
6:93 5:20 0:47 61:66
￿ y i m
86:71 0:42 4:87 1:53
6:01 91:40 10:69 33:74
2:42 3:65 83:91 5:27
4:85 4:53 0:53 59:46





￿ y i m
86:58 0:42 4:89 1:52
6:40 91:40 10:65 33:81
2:48 3:65 83:92 5:73
4:54 4:53 0:54 58:94
￿ y i m
86:20 0:27 4:90 1:52
7:61 91:35 10:62 33:88
2:64 4:12 83:93 6:11
1:55 4:26 0:55 58:49
The table reports the forecast error variance decomposition for in￿ ation (￿),
GDP (y), the overnight rate (i) and the monetary base growth rate (m). Panel A
reports ￿gures for the period 1980:1-1989:4, while Panel B for the period 1995:1-
2004:1.
25Table 2: Monte Carlo simulation results: 200 replications
￿￿ = 0:5




























































The table report the RMSE associated with the total cost minimisation rule
(MTC) and the minimum attainable RMSE (MA).
26Table 3: Monte Carlo simulation results: 200 replications
￿￿ = 1




























































The table report the RMSE associated with the total cost minimisation rule
(MTC) and the minimum attainable RMSE (MA).
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Figure 1: Cost-e¢ cient frontier (top plot) and total cost (0 < ￿ < 250: center
plot; 0 < ￿ < 100000: bottom plot).






































Figure 2: In￿ ation (￿) and output (y) impulse responses to a de￿ ation shock
(GFLS: generalised ￿ exible least squares; OLS: ordinary least squares).
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Figure 3: Monetary base growth (m) and in￿ ation (￿) impulse responses to a
monetary growth shock (GFLS: generalised ￿ exible least squares; OLS:
ordinary least squares).
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Figure 4: GDP (y) and in￿ ation (￿) impulse responses to an output growth
shock (GFLS: generalised ￿ exible least squares; OLS: ordinary least squares).
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Figure 5: Robustness analysis, impulse response functions: 1995:1-2004:1.
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Figure 6: Robustness analysis (thick modelling estimation), median impulse
response functions: 1995:1-2004:1 (sub case 1 (1) and sub case 2 (2)).
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Figure 7: Robustness analysis (thick modelling estimation), median impulse
response functions: 1995:1-2004:1 (long memory model; p: GDP de￿ ator, y:
GDP; m: nominal monetary base).
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